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Abstract

I analyze the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on school
revenues per student from property tax, from local sources, and school expenditures
per student in 676 Commuting Zones (CZ) from 1990 to 2007. I discover a negative
relationship on the CZ level between exposure per worker to Chinese import
competition and school expenditure per student, as well as school revenue per
student from local sources. In contrast, impact on school revenue per student from
property tax is not statistically significant. On average, in a given period, an increase
of 1000 dollars in import exposure is related to a decrease of 210.4 dollars in school
expenditure per student and a reduction of 83.15 dollars in school revenue per
student from local sources. In addition, different CZs face unequal levels of
exposure, which eventually lead to differences in student outcomes.
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Introduction
In recent years, especially after the election of President Trump in 2016, the trade
between the U.S and China has been a popular topic in international trade literature.
The popularity does not come from anywhere but the larger and broader impact of this
trade relationship on the U.S. Economy. Evident from the figures below, both U.S.
imports from and exports to China has increased dramatically ever since China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. As of December 2016, China is both
the largest trading partner and the source of imports for the U.S., accounting for 15.9%
of the total value of trade and 21.1% of the total value of imports (Census Bureau,
2020). The U.S. imports from China in 2018 are up 427% from 2001.
Figure 1. US imports (billion $) from (up) and exports to (down) China, 1995 to 2019 (Trading Economics,
2020)
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Like many other trade relationships between developed and developing countries,
the trade between the U.S. and China is not balanced in terms of types of goods and
services exchanged. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade,
China is relatively more labor-abundant, while the U.S. is relatively more capitalabundant. Therefore, in the bilateral trade between these two countries, China exports
more labor-intensive goods while the U.S. provides more capital-intensive products.
Therefore, labor-intensive sectors in the U.S. have to face import competition from
similar industries in China, and the magnitude of the economic consequences of this
competition varies between regions due to their diverse industrial structures.
In the trade literature, there has not been a shortage of studies on the labor market
effects of the trading activities with China since China joined WTO in 2001. However,
only a fraction of that attention has focused on other parts of local economies that may
experience more indirect impacts from trade, such as the education system. In this
paper, I am exploring the research question: What are the effects of the import
competitions from China on the U.S. public school spending and school revenue from
property tax on a Commuting Zone level? This paper aims to shed some light on the
educational impacts of international trade by connecting U.S. imports from China with
changes in school financial performance, which can further affect students’ future
outcomes. It shows that, on average, CZs that experience an increase in Chinese
import exposure see a drop in school revenue and expenditure. What’s more, CZs that
are more affected suffer more from the exposure than CZs that are less impacted. This
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gap leads to an enlarging gap between different CZs in terms of students’ future wages
and length of education. In addition, there may also be discrepancies in the quality of
education, such as a lower teacher/student ratio in more impacted CZs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Literature Review, I will present
related studies on the impacts of trade on the labor market and local business
activities, as well as papers on educational outcomes. In Empirical Framework, I will
introduce the model and present the summary statistics of variables used in the
model. In results, I will include the results and interpretation of them, followed by
connections between the results and educational outcome and areas of
improvement in Conclusion.

Literature Review
Local Labor Market Effects
Given the enormous size of imports from China and China’s comparative
advantage in unskilled manufacturing sectors, it’s not difficult to connect trade with
China and its negative impact on U.S. employment, especially in the competing
manufacturing sectors. Compared to the Chinese counterparts, production of the
same goods and services in the U.S. incur a higher labor cost, which leads to losses
of orders to the Chinese factories. From 1999 to 2011, job losses from rising Chinese
import competition are estimated to be in the range of 2 to 2.4 million (Acemoglu, Autor,
Dorn, Hanson, & Price, 2016). Another study links the sharp drop in U.S.

5

manufacturing employment after 2000 to changes in U.S. trade policies that eliminated
potential tariff increases on Chinese imports (Pierce & Schott, 2016).
Not only is the U.S. manufacturing employment suffering from import competition,
but the impacts also land differently across the nation as different regions house
different types of manufacturing industries. In their influential paper on the local labor
market effects of rising Chinese import competition, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson find that
rising imports cause higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and lower
wages in local labor markets that have import-competing manufacturing industries
(Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2013). Pierce and Schott (2016) also discover that sectors
more exposed to the changes in U.S. trade policies on China experienced more
significant employment loss.

Extended Local Economic Impacts
The impacts of Chinese import competition extend beyond loss of employment.
The economies in the profoundly affected regions is likely to suffer from declines in
manufacturing sectors. Feler and Senses (2017) discover that areas in the U.S. with
declining labor demand and incomes due to increasing import competition from China
experience relative declines in housing prices and business activity. Figure 2 shows
the relationships between the log value of home value, government revenue,
government expenditure, and educational expenditure. Declines in property value and
business activities lead directly to reductions in revenue for local governments,
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constraining their ability to provide quality public services.
Figure 2. Home Values, Government Revenue, and Educational Expenditure (Feler and Senses, 2017)

School Funding and Student Performance
As an example of public facilities, public schools rely heavily on local financial
support to provide education for students from kindergarten to 12th grade. According
to Education Week, they receive funding from three sources: states, local districts, and
the federal government. The states contribute around 48% of the budget for
elementary and secondary schools from a combination of income taxes, corporate
taxes, sales taxes, and other fees. Local districts provide about 44%, which mostly
come from local property tax. A recent study shows that local property tax account for
more than a third of school funding (Reschovsky, 2017). Figure 3 shows that property
tax accounts for between 25 and 50 percent of total revenue for schools in over half
of all the states. Finally, the federal government covers approximately 8% of the
budget. What’s more, the federal- and state-level sources only include the essential
funding for schools and are usually less responsive than local sources to changes in
demand on the school side (Chen, 2020). Therefore, as local governments collect less
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revenue from local property tax, schools are expected to experience a decline in their
budgets as well.
Figure 3. Property tax revenues as a percentage of total school revenues, by state: school year 2016-17 (National
Center for Educational Statistics, 2020)

Shifting the focus from changes in school revenue to potential impacts of these
changes on students, I find that there is no lack of studies that focus on the connection
between school revenue and student performance. Linking school spending and
finance reform data with nationally representative data on children born between 1955
and 1985 followed through 2011, Jackson et al. (2016) show that a 10% increase in
per-pupil spending each year for all 12 years of public school leads to 0.31 more
completed years of education, about 7% higher wages, and a 3.2 percentage point
reduction in the annual incidence of adult poverty. Additionally, children from lowincome families experience these positive effects more conspicuously. Some scholars
also look at the differential academic impacts of school funding on the academic
performance of students. With data from 54 districts, Payne and Biddle (1999) show
8

that well-funded schools in communities with low levels of poverty earn much higher
achievement scores in mathematics than miserably funded schools in high-poverty
communities.
In addition to the positive impacts of increases in school funding on aspects of
students’ future performance, such as wages and years of education, better education
also has other indirect effects on students. Education can indirectly improve an
individual’s health through work and economic condition, given the better chance of
employment and more of an opportunity for enjoyable work life. The well-educated
also have a more positive lifestyle as they are more likely to exercise and get annual
health check-ups(Ross & Chia-Ling Wu, 1995). As people obtain more years of
education, they are less likely to commit personal crimes, such as assault and injury
(Groot & van den Brink, 2010). Although these findings do not necessarily translate
into adverse effects in students’ future performance in the face of drops in school
spending, a lack of increases in spending is connected with failure to capture these
positive effects.

Empirical Framework
The estimation strategy of exploring the relationship between Chinese import
competition and school expenditure and revenue from property tax is based on the
empirical framework developed by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). I borrow their
2SLS model of estimating exposure to Chinese import competition while replacing
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variables related to the labor market with school financial variables to explore the
connection between import exposure and educational outcomes.

First Stage: Instrumental Variable Approach
The measurement of the import competition from China is based on the changes
in the value of U.S. imports from China within a period on a CZ level. The use of CZs
instead of larger geographical divisions such as states or census divisions is to capture
the potential differences in exposure to Chinese import between different zones within
states or other larger divisions. The Chinese import exposure index, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# , is
calculated using the share of CZ employment in national employment in specific
industries j as a proxy for CZ share of changes in U.S. imports from China:
∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# = &
$

𝐸"$# ∆𝑀!%$#
∗
𝐸!$#
𝐸"#

In this equation, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# is the measurement of import exposure per worker in CZ i
over period t. ∆𝑀!%$# is the change in U.S. imports from China in industry j over period
t. 𝐸"$# is employment in industry j in CZ i at the beginning of the period t. 𝐸!$# is the
total employment in the U.S. in industry j at the beginning of t. 𝐸"# is employment of
CZ i at the beginning of t. The sum over all industries j gives the Chinese import
exposure index for CZ i.
One problem remains in using ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# as the import exposure index. The change
in imports from China to the U.S. can have two sources: supply-driven import shocks
as a result of rising productivity in Chinese exporting industries and demand-driven
10

import shocks as a result of increasing demand for imported Chinese goods and
services. A similar import exposure index, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# , is created to rule out the demanddriven shock:
∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# = &
$

𝐸"$#'( ∆𝑀&%$#
∗
𝐸!$#'( 𝐸"#'(

∆𝑀&%$# is the change in imports from China by a selected group of high-income
countries in industry j over period t. Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland are chosen because they have comparable
trade data in the entire sample period. 𝐸"$#'( is employment in industry j in CZ i at the
beginning of the period before period t. 𝐸!$#'( is the total employment in the U.S. in
industry j at the beginning of the period before period t. 𝐸"#'( is the population of CZ
i at the beginning of the period before period t. The sum over all industries j gives the
*!)# . The purpose of using lagged employment data is
instrument for predicting ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊
to eliminate the changes in employment due to the anticipation of changes in Chinese
imports. The first-stage instrumental variable regression is:
∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# = 𝛼* + 𝛼( ∗ ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# + 𝜖
the coefficient 𝛼
.( is then multiplied with ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# to predict ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# . Figure 4 plots
the results of this regression.
The use of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# to instrument ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# relies on the assumption that
variation in the instrumental variable is driven by changes in supply from China due
to decreases in trade costs and more substantial comparative advantage for China in
different sectors. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) mention three potential threats to
11

Figure 4. Plot of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# against ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊$"#

this assumption. First, the growth in Chinese imports for high-income countries may
be correlated. Second, the Chinese import shocks in the import-competing sectors for
the selected high-income countries may be a result of a negative productivity shock in
the U.S. instead of a positive productivity shock in China. Third, a similar negative
productivity shock may happen in these high-income countries, which drives the
increases in Chinese imports.
They rule out the first threat by replacing U.S. imports from China with estimated
changes in China’s comparative advantage and market access in a modified gravity
model. Although they are unable to rule out the last two threats completely, they argue
that growth in China’s exports is strongly related to factors specific to China.
Initially, I attempted to calculate ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# with data from the same
sources and the method described in their paper but extended to 2016. For traderelated data, they used the UN Comtrade Database, which provides bilateral trade
value data between different countries. Different goods are categorized by the six-digit
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). They aggregated the
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six-digit HS codes to four digits and matched them to Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) industry categories.
The employment data used in calculating trade shock indices are collected from
the County Business Patterns (CBP) database. It is an annual data series that provide
employment, firm size, and payroll information by county and industry. They use an
estimation method (with limited detail in their paper) by creating a sample of county
employment and regressing the CBP data with that sample although the CBP
database also has the exact employment number by county and industry. As I used
the exact employment number instead of their method to estimate CZ employment
structures, my calculations are drastically different from theirs. Therefore, I decided to
use their ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# and restrict the periods to a pre-period of 1990-2000
and a post-period of 2000-2007.

Second Stage: Shared Components
There are two second-stage models: one about school revenue from property tax
and the other about school expenditure.
The models share a common independent variable ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# from the first stage,
which is the prediction based on ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊&"# .
They also include two types of fixed effects to combat the potential biases. The
year fixed effects (𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) controls for the changes in property tax revenue due to
changes in time, so that growth/decline in school expenditure per student in CZ i during
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period t (∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# ) or school revenue per student from property tax in CZ i during
period t (∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# ) from 1990 to 2007 is not counted as effects of Chinese
import competition. The location fixed effects (𝑖. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) account for differences in
∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# or ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# across different regions (e.g., census divisions or
states) that are due to similar characteristics of CZs in the same region. For example,
CZs in the same census division may have related policies that are different from CZs
in other divisions regarding the proportion of school revenue that comes from local
property tax.
The two models are weighted by the beginning of period CZ’s total enrollment
because CZs with a larger student population should be more representative than
those with a smaller student population. Clustered standard errors are used at the
state level to allow for potential interactions between different CZs within the same
state.

Second Stage: Revenue from Property Tax
The model for school revenue from property tax contains six components. The
dependent variable is ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# . I choose CZ enrollment data at the beginning
of t for the conversion into per student terms to attenuate the heteroskedasticity
problem brought by diverse sizes of school systems across different commuting zones.
I also include the beginning of period school revenue from property tax per student
in CZ i (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# ) to account for the possible scenario in which impact of the
14

same amount of ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# may be different for CZs with various initial school
revenue from property tax per student (e.g., a CZ with $1000 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# and a
CZ with $200 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# can feel a decrease of $100 in 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"#
differently).
Additionally, I control for the changes in school revenue from the federal
government per student in a given period t in CZ i (∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# ) and the changes in
school revenue from the federal government per student in a given period t in CZ i
(∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# ) because local governments may adjust 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# based on how much
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# can be covered by a positive ∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# or ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# so that they
can spend the excess amount of property tax revenue on other public services.
Changes in school revenue per student from other local sources (∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# ) is also
added to account for potential adjustments to structures of school funding on the local
level.
The model is:
*!)# + 𝛽+ × 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"#'( + 𝛽, × ∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"#
∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# = 𝛽* + 𝛽( × ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊
+ 𝛽- × ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# + 𝛽. × ∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# + 𝛽/ × 𝑖. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽0 × 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖"#

Second Stage: School Expenditure
The model for school expenditure contains five components. The dependent
variable is ∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# .
In addition to ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# , 𝑖. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 that are also part of the previous
15

model, this model includes the beginning of period school expenditure per student on
CZ level ( 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# ), which serves a similar purpose as 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# to
address the differences in changes in school expenditure per student that are related
to the size of the initial expenditure. CZs with smaller school expenditures per student
may experience a minor change in expenditure compared to those with larger initial
expenditure simply because they have less room for adjustment.
The model is:
*!)# + 𝛾+ × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"#'( + 𝛾, × 𝑖. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# = 𝛾* + 𝛾( × ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊
+ 𝛾- × 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖"#1
The educational data is from the Common Core of Data. It provides the total
expenditure, total local revenue from property tax, total salaries, total Federal revenue,
total State Revenue, and enrollment on the school district level for about 13,000 school
districts in the U.S. between 1990 and 2007. Converted to constant 2007 U.S. dollars,
the school district level data is aggregated to Commuting Zone level with a crosswalk
from counties to 1990 Commuting Zone divisions created by Autor et al. (2013). Then,
the data on revenue and expenditure are converted to per capita terms.

Summary statistics
In Table 1, summary statistics for the variables used in the two models are
presented. The tables are split into the two periods used in this study, 1990-2000
and 2000-2007.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for educational data and import exposure indices
1990-2000

count

mean

sd

min

max

∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# ($)

676

743.84

1486.22

-3744.49

6709.89

∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# ($)

676

3366.02

1613.99

-6156.46

9727.19

∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# (k $)

676

1.117

.976

-.0754

25.41

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"#%& ($)

676

2616.65

1612.17

0

8636.45

𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"#%& ($)

676

12869.27

3177.19

6862.93

23125.20

∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# ($)

676

192.74

179.90

-2173.04

3589.29

∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# ($)

676

1287.57

1134.92

-2045.33

14367.45

∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# ($)

676

513.44

563.13

-2168.03

5165.10

2000-2007

count

mean

sd

min

∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# ($)

676

647.24

713.42

-3603.14

10194.79

∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# ($)

676

2365.03

1534.71

-8193.64

15543.91

∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# (k $)

676

2.556

1.851

-.629

43.08

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"#%& ($)

676

3384.79

1953.06

0

11538.51

𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"#%& ($)

676

15980.17

3157.62

9586.78

30630.52

∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# ($)

676

292.69

252.45

-656.82

4800.09

∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# ($)

676

675.76

796.57

-5228.81

17621.02

∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# ($)

676

587.06

1760.19

-1855.80

50123.81

max

Between 1990 and 2000, the mean value of ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# was 743 dollars per
student. However, there are huge variations between CZs. Some are reporting a
decrease of 3744.49 dollars per student, whereas others are reporting an increase of
6709.89 dollars per student. The mean value of ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# decreases slightly in
the second period to 647.24 dollars per student with a smaller standard deviation. The
minimum value did not change much, while the maximum value increased drastically
to 10194.79 dollars per student. ∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# experiences a decline of around
1000 dollars from the first period to the second period, and the gap between the
minimum and maximum ∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# gets wider over time.
The import exposure indices for the U.S. increased from 1117 dollars per worker
17

in the pre-period to 2556 dollars per worker in the post period. There is also a wider
gap between the most and the least impacted CZs between the two periods.
∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# experienced a relatively small increase of about 100 dollars between
the two periods, whereas ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# in the post-period dropped to approximately half of
the value in the pre-period. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# shows a minimal increase over time.

Results
When running the model for property tax, I start from the simplest model and
progress to the full model. In the simplest model (column 1), I only include ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# ,
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# , and year dummies as an attempt to see if I can determine the general
direction of the coefficient. In column 2, I add the revenue from the federal government,
state governments, and local government except property tax into the simplest model
to control for the potential impacts of Chinese import competition on school revenues
from other sources. In column 3, I add the dummies that account for the nine census
divisions as an attempt to rule out the impact of geographical differences between CZs
that are located in different census regions. Finally, in column 4, I replace the census
division dummies with dummies for states to capture more detailed differences
between different states within the same census division (e.g., the state government
may have the same regulations regarding the use of school revenue from the state).
The results are presented in Table 2.
In column 1, the coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# is positive, although not statistically
18

significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# is small and statistically
significant at the 10% level.
In column 2, the coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# is still positive yet not statistically
significant. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# has little change from column 1. Both
∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# and ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# have negative coefficients, although only the coefficient of
∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# is significant at the 1% level. Controlling for time, changes in other sources
of CZ school revenue and beginning of period CZ school revenue per student from the
Table 2. Regression with clustered standard errors; location and year dummies are omitted in the table
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"#
(1)

(2)

(3)

Add

Add Census

Revenue

Division

(4)

VARIABLES

Basic

∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# (k $)

6.963

7.804

-54.84

-79.72

(38.78)

(28.44)

(39.51)

(50.14)

0.141*

0.146***

-0.0187

-0.0629

(0.0750)

(0.0433)

(0.0495)

(0.0389)

-1.023

-0.894

-0.634

(1.176)

(0.890)

(0.823)

-0.512***

-0.501***

-0.498***

(0.106)

(0.0866)

(0.0955)

0.0579

0.0161

0.0323

(0.0436)

(0.0335)

(0.0360)

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# ($)
∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# ($)
∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# ($)
∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# ($)

Use State

Observations

1,352

1,352

1,352

1,352

R-squared

0.048

0.303

0.476

0.622

Clustered standard errors (by state) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

federal government, an increase of 1 dollar in CZ school revenue per student from the
state government is related to a decrease of 0.51 dollars in CZ school revenue per
student from property tax. Intuitively, as schools receive more funding from state
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governments, they need less funding from local sources. The coefficient of other local
revenue sources ∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# is positive as expected, albeit not significant.
In column 3, the coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# becomes negative, although still
insignificant. ∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# is still not significant enough, either, while ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# has a
negligible change from column 2, although this model controls for differences between
census regions. In other words, after eliminating differences between census divisions
that can be correlated with ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# , the negative relationship between
∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# and ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# still holds.
In column 4, the negative coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# is larger in magnitude than in
column 3, although not significant. The coefficient of ∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# is close to that in
column 3, suggesting a consistent negative relationship between state-level and locallevel CZ school revenue throughout the second stage regression.
The results of the second model about school expenditure are presented below in
Table 3. In column 1, the basic model only includes 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# and year dummies.
In column 2, similar to column 3 in Table 2, census division dummies are added to
account for regional differences. The geographical controls are switched to state
dummies in column 3 to control for differences between CZs in different states.
In all columns, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# has a negative coefficient, indicating a consistent
negative relationship between import exposure and changes in school spending. In
column 2, the coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# is significant at 1% level. Controlling for the
beginning of period school expenditure per student, time, and census divisions, an
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increase of 1000 dollars in import exposure per worker in a CZ is correlated with a
Table 3. Regression with clustered standard errors; location and year dummies are omitted in the table
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"#
(1)

(2)
Add Census

(3)

VARIABLES

Basic

∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# (k $)

-12.51

-143.4***

-210.4***

(47.90)

(51.13)

(69.13)

0.0893

-0.163

-0.331*

(0.0782)

(0.129)

(0.174)

Observations

1,352

1,352

1,352

R-squared

0.048

0.476

0.622

𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒"# ($)

Division

Use State

Clustered standard errors (by state) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

decrease of 143.4 dollars in school expenditure per student in that CZ. The magnitude
of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# increases to 210.4 dollars when census divisions are replaced with state
controls.
Since the model for property tax returns results not significant enough, I modify
that model to test if total local revenue sources are affected by the import exposure. I
replaced ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# with ∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# with 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# .
∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# is the sum of ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# , while 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# is the
sum of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥"# and 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# . ∆𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# is dropped from the first model. The
columns follow the same structure as Table 2. Results are presented in Table 4.
Across all columns, there is a negative relationship between import exposure
and changes in school revenue per student from local sources. Without geographical
controls, the coefficients are not significant at the 10% level. Controlling for census
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Table 4. Regression with clustered standard errors; location and year dummies are omitted in the table
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"#
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Basic

Add Revenue

Add Census Division

Use State

∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# (k $)

-32.69

-21.99

-60.68**

-83.15**

(45.50)

(40.78)

(28.92)

(33.78)

0.305***

0.321***

0.308***

0.308***

(0.0324)

(0.0242)

(0.0253)

(0.0254)

-0.589

-0.501

-0.436

(0.989)

(0.817)

(0.787)

-0.646***

-0.625***

-0.612***

(0.130)

(0.119)

(0.135)

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙"# ($)
∆𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙"# ($)
∆𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒"# ($)
Observations

1,352

1,352

1,352

1,352

R-squared

0.048

0.303

0.476

0.622

Clustered standard errors (by state) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

divisions, time, and other school revenue sources in column 3, an increase of 1000
dollars in import exposure per worker in a CZ is correlated with a decrease of 60
dollars in school expenditure per student from local sources. The magnitude of this
coefficient increases when census division controls are replaced with state dummies
while maintaining a significance level of 5%. Also, the coefficient of ∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"# in Table
3 is close to the coefficient in Table 1 albeit the standard error in Table 3 is much
smaller than in Table 1. This shows that much of the changes in school revenue from
local sources are due to changes in school revenue per student from property tax.

Conclusion
Following China’s admission into WTO at the beginning of this century, there has
been increased interest in studying the effects of the trading activities with China on
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the U.S. economy. As China has gradually become one of the largest trading partners
of the U.S., scholars started to look at the impacts of rising imports from China, which
stimulate more and more competition with U.S. firms in sectors such as traditional
manufacturing.
Following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson’s (2013) idea of disaggregating exposure per
worker to Chinese competition from the country level to CZ level, I find that exposure
to Chinese imports has negative impacts on both school expenditure per student and
changes in school revenue per student from local sources. Specifically, controlling for
differences across states and time, a one standard deviation increase in import
exposure per worker is correlated with a 0.21 standard deviation decrease in school
expenditure per student. In comparison, controlling for time, differences across states,
and school revenue from state and federal sources, a one standard deviation increase
in import exposure per worker is correlated with a 0.08 standard deviation decrease
in school revenue per student from local sources. In terms of standard deviation
interpretations, school expenditure is more negatively impacted by exposure to
Chinese imports than school revenue from local sources. Since the model for school
revenue per student from property tax does not return results significant enough, the
negative impacts on school revenue per student from local sources might be due to
other sources of local governments’ revenue, such as income tax. Compared to
property values, decreases in income are more direct and effective as workers are
possibly paying less income tax due to lower incomes and unemployment.
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One possible explanation for this difference in impacts on school expenditure and
local revenue is that local governments might have room for adjustment in terms of
the funding sent to schools. When local economies are negatively affected by rising
exposures to Chinese imports, local governments can potentially increase the tax
rates to smooth out part of the shock or devote a larger ratio of local revenue to schools.
However, it might be difficult for schools to smooth out their expenditure, especially as
increases in revenue from state governments almost dropped by half from the first
period to the second period.
What’s more, different CZs do not experience the same level of exposure.
∆𝐼𝑃𝑊!"#

of the CZ at the 10th percentile is about 3000 dollars less than the CZ at the

90th percentile, indicating that some CZs probably suffer more in terms of school
revenue and expenditure than others. With the results of Table 3, I translate this
difference in exposure to Chinese imports to an estimated gap of 631.2 dollars in
school expenditure per student, which is roughly equivalent to 12.5% of the changes
in school expenditure per student in Jackson et al.’s (2016) results. This number is an
underestimation of the actual difference between the 10th percentile and the 90th
percentile CZs in terms of differences in expenditure since Jackson et al. (2016) used
a more extended period (12 years) than this study (8.5 years on average). This
difference in school expenditure per student can lead to roughly a gap of 14 completed
days of education, 0.9% of wages, and 0.4 percentage points in the annual incidence
of adult poverty. The Census Bureau lists the annual median personal income as
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31099 dollars in 2016, which means the workers in these two CZs can have a median
wage difference of at least 300 dollars that is related to the difference in exposure per
worker to Chinese imports in these CZs. Jackson et al. (2016) also point out that lower
per student expenditure can also lead to negative effects on the quality of education
which are harder to be quantified, such as a lower teacher/student ratio.
In other words, the results of this study depict an unequal future between different
CZs. As CZs suffer differently from rising exposure to Chinese imports, students in
more affected CZs get smaller funding than students in the less affected CZs.
Consequently, they are likely to experience a worse future in terms of wages, length
of education, and poverty than those from less affected places. They are more likely
to then work in labor-intensive industries that face more severe exposure to imports,
creating a loop of enlarging inequalities between CZs that passes on through
generations.
There are undoubtedly many ways in which this study can be improved. A more
recent version of the study can be helpful in terms of exploring if the trends from more
than ten years ago still hold in more recent years. There are likely other variables that
can influence school expenditure and revenue, which I did not include in this study.
The estimated effects on student future outcomes are quite imprecise due to the
assumptions made during the calculations; a more precise evaluation can better depict
the educational outcomes of rising Chinese imports per worker.
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